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'Police fire on rioters': everyday counterinsurgency in a colonial capital

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ABSTRACT

Many have shown how 'the British way', a doctrine of minimum force, was problematic in theory and practice, especially in the final decades of empire. While the role of the colonial police in suppressing uprisings is often overlooked, this article argues that the police carried out everyday counterinsurgency campaigns. Using British archival records, this article examines a 1950 dockworker strike in Dar es Salaam, the colonial capital of former Tanganyika. Workers' resistance was perceived by colonial authorities as insurgency, which led to the crosspollination of new policing strategies throughout the British Empire to expand surveillance, control riots, and break strikes.

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Introduction

'The British Way' of counterinsurgency contradicted its defining tenet of minimum use of force, especially in the face of uprisings that challenged colonial rule. Instances of wholesale coercion, excessive use of force, and violent acts tantamount to war crimes have been increasingly brought to light since the uncovering of the British Migrated Archives in the early 2000s. The atrocities carried out by British military and special forces in the final decades of formal colonial rule have led some to call these episodes 'small wars' and 'dirty wars'. While police forces played a role in many of these episodes, there has been less attention to the more routine, everyday acts of violence carried out by the police in colonial territories and the transnational nature of the development of policing tactics during this period. This article analyzes the centrality of the police in counterinsurgency campaigns leading up to the fall of the British Empire. The nature of colonial suppression and

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anti-colonial resistance cannot be fully understood without considering this overlooked role of the police, particularly in urbanizing areas where commercial and government power was concentrated.

'The British way' of counterinsurgency and the myth of minimum force

This article examines how the police were central to the British Empire's attempts to contain what they perceived as insurgencies, or as threats to their rule in externally occupied territories. Colonial administrators deployed what were for all intents and purposes counterinsurgency campaigns. The origins of western counterinsurgency campaigns are often traced back to British tactics against anti-colonial uprisings around the 1950s and 1960s, notably in Malaya,[1] Kenya,[2] Palestine,[3] and Northern Ireland.[4] Those credited with founding British counterinsurgency doctrine were soldiers who drew from their experience in campaigns throughout the twentieth century, the height and fall of the British Empire.[5] This doctrine articulates common principles to defeat insurgents while also calling for these principles to be adapted to changing and unique situations accordingly. This flexibility is why methods to counter anti-colonial and communist insurgents are still deemed relevant today, according to a principal author of the British Army's 2009 *Counterinsurgency Doctrine*.[6] This legacy has led the United Kingdom to see itself as a world leader of counterinsurgency conduct in winning 'hearts and minds', even though the historical and contemporary record suggests otherwise.[7] The so-called 'British way'[8] would go onto influence international counterinsurgency models invoked and enshrined around the world for decades to come, perhaps most notably in the U.S. Army Field Manual.[9]

The core feature of this allegedly timeless model is minimum use of force.[10] Instead of using force, the expressed goal of establishing internal security and legitimacy was to be pursued through winning 'hearts and minds'. Police officers were deployed as the best agents to achieve this, in philosophical contradistinction to the military. Successful counterinsurgency campaigns without the Armed Forces[11] or in tandem with the Armed Forces[12] have been attributed to effective police (e.g. India following 1907 and Palestine in 1939, respectively). Conversely, failed counterinsurgency campaigns have been blamed on incompetent police (e.g. Ireland in 1923).[13] Policing as a strategy was key to maintaining control, as described in the contemporary British manual as well as in one of the earliest manuals of counterinsurgency doctrine from 1934, entitled simply, *Imperial Policing*.[14] The other method developed out of this imperial era was using air power to drop bombs with the newly formed Royal Air Force, but this was seen as 'too crude and blunt to be effective' for counterinsurgency, and consequently today remains only as a 'supporting' component.[15]

In practice, the doctrine of minimum force has been called into question given the use of extreme violence to suppress anti-colonial resistance. Instances of wholesale coercion, excessive use of force, and war crimes have been increasingly brought to light since the uncovering of the British Migrated Archives in the early 2000s. In Kenya, for instance, the torture, forced detention camps, and atrocities carried out by British military and special forces in the final decades of formal colonial rule have led some to call these episodes 'dirty wars'.[16] Architects of contemporary British counterinsurgency doctrine point out that 'minimum force does not mean not using force', and 'if a bomb is required, use a bomb', as evidenced in Iraq and Afghanistan, where practice is 'very different from the accepted norms'.[17]

Influenced by the 'British way', U.S. counterinsurgency strategists shifted from 'major combat operations' that are often associated with the military, 'into the realm of law enforcement'.[18] The U.S. Army Field Manual's section on 'Police in Counterinsurgency' cites the British development of a police force in Malaya on which they base their strategy: 'The primary frontline COIN force is often the police – not the military'.[19] Even in cases where military troops were seen as better equipped to suppress insurgents, counterinsurgency strategy maintains that the police may be better suited to intervene, especially in urban areas, because police officers may be viewed by local populations as more legitimate wielders of force.[20] Furthermore, the police may be better at collecting intelligence and using their daily contact with locals to stop 'small insurgent bands' and arrest, detain, and prosecute accordingly.[21] Military strategists contend that local police forces bring the added benefit of '[reinforcing] the rule of law'.[22] There seems to be consensus around the unique and central role of the police in western counterinsurgency campaigns.

Nonetheless, the generally asserted distinction between the police and military (i.e. the police are a civilian force in contrast to the military) has been characterized as a myth intended to increase the perceived legitimacy of the police.[23] Policing throughout the British Empire calls into question this myth. Soldiers regularly trained and equipped the police and backed up police forces in emergencies, as the case I describe in this article will show. Colonial ordinances also provided for the police force to be employed 'as a military force when called upon by the Governor to discharge military duties' and to carry arms accordingly.[24] In case of war, the Governor could employ the police force in defense of the territory, and the police would then be subject to military law.[25] It is therefore not entirely surprising that British colonial officials had to grapple with how police could use force to effectively serve as 'a colony's first line of defence,' while still aiming to be seen as a civilian force.[26]

The colonial police increasingly used force following World War II and innovated new riot control methods to suppress resistance to British rule, including tear-smoke, sickening gases, riot batons, shields, and rubber bullets,

which would be brought back to 'the home forces' in the U.K.[27] While it is acknowledged that police forces likely participated in many of the aforementioned 'dirty wars', the more routine, everyday acts of violence they carried out to suppress insurgencies in colonial territories has been neglected. This oversight is potentially driven by the fallacy that the police are a civilian force.

Police officers were also tasked with intelligence gathering and surveillance operations in counterinsurgency campaigns. The British Army's contemporary manuals cite methods learned from policing the empire, namely creating intelligence organizations, using identification cards to control population movement, forming cordons (a line or circle of police to prevent access to an area), and conducting detailed searches.[28] The police are therefore crucial to understanding both the material and informational side of colonial counterinsurgency.

The transnational policing of capital in capitals

This article focuses on the often-overlooked role of the police in suppressing anti-colonial uprisings because the police were conceived as central to British counterinsurgency strategy, especially in urbanizing areas where capital was increasingly concentrated. In these key commercial areas, workers were closely monitored and surveilled since the functioning of the British Empire and the operating of individual administrative colonies depended on indigenous labor and resource extraction. The police were the main agents tasked with preventing breakdowns of public and capitalist order and suppressing challenges to British legitimacy and rule, which resulted in workers frequently coming head-to-head with the police. Interactions between the police and workers in urbanizing areas sparked new counterinsurgency experiments to expand surveillance, improve intelligence gathering, control so-called 'riots' and 'disturbances', and break strikes.

However, the role of the police and policing methods in commercial centers did not emerge in a vacuum. Some contend that police officers working in Britain were fundamentally different to those working in Britain's colonies. The colonial police's function was regarded as 'protecting the economic and political interests of the colonial state, and ensuring that the government was not overthrown', while their function in Britain was to serve as 'politically independent servants of the people … whose main function was to prevent and detect crime'.[29] However, annual reports reveal that crime prevention was a justification that colonial police commissioners used to solicit larger budgets from London. Controlling crime then was perhaps not so distinct from protecting dominant economic and political interests in either the colony or metropole.

Police historians have argued that the institutional development of the professionalized police in the London cannot be understood apart from the development of the police in Britain's colonies.[30] While contextual differences certainly exist, policing in colonies and the metropole was 'directly linked to the commercial interests of an expanding capitalism in search of new markets and resources'.[31] Police in these different contexts served a common economic interest. The growth of colonial police forces and prisons was interconnected to Britain's rapid urbanization and industrialization, internal uprisings,[32] and the professionalization of the police force. Colonial experiments with policing, especially aimed at controlling labor, would be transferred back to London and inform future strategies there, as I will describe at the end of this article.

From the beginning, the colonial police force was a transnational invention for countering resistance to British rule. Professionalized policing grew out of the British occupation of Ireland, and then was imposed on other British colonies and further developed out of experiences trying to control colonized peoples and territories around the world.[33] Criminologists are increasingly going beyond a comparative framing to examine how control policies are not simply applied from one country to another but are interconnected on a global scale.[34] The domestic and international feedback loop of police training and personnel from the former U.S. Office of Public Safety[35] exemplifies how policing strategies and institutions were created by and through transnational networks, especially in the service of imperialism.[36]

The transnational and imperial purpose of policing could not be clearer than in the period of 'high colonialism', demarcated by European attempts to extend and establish an administrative network across occupied territories following World War I. In the U.K. National Archives, the transnational design of policing is tangible in simple tables sketching out what policies, institutions, and personnel would carry over from one colony to another. Figure 1 illustrates how the Tanganyika Territory's first police ordinance was sourced from legislation in other British territories, including Kenya, India, and the Gold Coast.[37] Before this point in Tanganyika there was a combined police and prison department, and so the 1933 Police Ordinance was introduced to grant the police additional powers and protections under the law when the department split. For example, one provision was copied from Kenya's 1930 Police Ordinance to protect officers from liability for anything they do under a warrant.[38] Other provisions were expressly modeled on considerations given to soldiers, such as those established to facilitate the making of wills and distribution of estates after death.[39]

A new prison ordinance was simultaneously passed by the governor and legislature that underwent a parallel process and aimed to fortify colonial control over the territory and facilitate more revenue generation. Clause 122, for example, was copied from English law to make it an offence to harbor



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THE POLICE ORDINANCE, 1933 (NO. OF 1933).

COMPARATIVE TABLE.

Sections.	Source.
1 - 2	New.
3 - 12	Kenya Ord. No.64 of 1930, sections 3 - 12.
13	" " " " 15.
14	" " " " 16(3) & (4).
15	" " " " 17.
16(1)-(3)	" " " " 19(1)-(3).
16(4)	" " " " 19(7).
Proviso	New.
17	Kenya Ord. No.64 of 1930, section 20.
18(1)	" " " " " 22.
(2)	Tanganyika Cap.40, section 22.
(3)	Kenya Ord. No.64 of 1930, section 23.
19	" " " " 24(2).
20	" " " " 25.
21(1)	" " " " 26.
(2)	Tanganyika Cap.40, section 16.
22	Kenya Ord. No.64 of 1930, section 27.
23	Tanganyika Cap.40, section 27.
24(1) & (3)	Kenya Ord. No.64 of 1930, section 28(1) & (2).
(2)	Tanganyika Cap.40, section 24.
25(1)-(5)	Indian Criminal Procedure Code, section 165.
(6)	" " " " " 103(3) cf. note (a) below.
26	New.
27 - 31	Kenya Ord. No.64 of 1930, sections 29-33.
32	" " " 35.
33	" " " 34.
34	" " " 36.
35	" " " 38.

Figure 1. Comparative table of the Tanganyika Territory's 1933 police ordinance (page 1 of 3).The National Archives of the UK, ref.CO691/133/12.

escaped fugitives 'to facilitate re-capture'.[40] Other laws were explicitly labeled 'new experiments', such as Clause 87, which set up a scheme for unpaid convict labor developed from the 1927 Palestine Penal Labour Ordinance.[41]

Police personnel were also shuffled around as if colonies were all branches of the same company.[42] If lower-ranking officers had served in Uganda, Nyasaland, or Kenya, they could count this time toward their probationary period 'as if it has been service in the [Tanganyika] Force'.[43] British colonial police forces were made up of roughly three groups of people that were

structured hierarchically: at the bottom were indigenous Africans in constabulary roles who constituted the majority of force, in the middle and top were international recruits who had been trained in the metropole and other colonies (especially India, which was one of Britain's oldest colonies), and at the top were white officers in the primary leadership roles. Some white officers enrolled in the colonial police forces because they could not find work elsewhere after serving in wars, and they were attracted to Africa due to a 'childhood fascination' with stories of European explorers (e.g. David Livingstone) that told of 'savagery', 'horror', and 'gruesome atrocities'.[44] While colonial archives tend to be limited to the words of higher-ranking police commissioners and exclude indigenous populations who were recruited in the lowest ranks of colonial forces, one could expect for there to have been crosspollination of ideas, practices, and stories among officers given the international nature of their work.[45]

In some cases, policing operations transcended state borders to suppress neighboring uprisings. One notable instance was when the Tanganyika police were dispatched to quell an uprising to the south in Nyasaland in 1959. This incident led one member of the Legislative Council, Representative Amir Jamal, to contest the legitimacy of the police in Tanganyika and question the allocation of additional funds to the police.[46] It led to the promotion of Deputy Acting Police Commissioner Michael Macoun to Commissioner of Police in Uganda, who was replaced by a transfer from Northern Rhodesia.[47] Cross-national bureaucratic exchanges may have aided collaboration and communication across colonial lines to suppress resistance through shared surveillance, intelligence, and strategies. This has implications for the postcolonial period because the global transfusion and fortification of these methods by the U.K. would not end there.[48]

The context of Postwar Dar es Salaam

Following World War II, the British Empire was in crisis: it needed additional resources to fuel reconstruction, yet the hypocrisy of its involvement in WWII while occupying colonial territories became increasingly untenable. The rising wave of anti-colonial resistance across the Empire led British officials to ramp up policing budgets, infrastructure, personnel, and activity in colonized territories.[49] The dynamic between colonial crackdowns through the police and resistance to them is especially evident in sites of organized labor during this turning point in the British Empire.

This article offers a new empirical analysis of a major strike in 1950 that was violently suppressed by the police in Dar es Salaam, the colonial capital of former Tanganyika, or what is today known as mainland Tanzania. The consequent series of demonstrations across town, police mobilization, and new surveillance policies and riot control practices that followed provide

a window into how policing was deployed and reformed to contain challenges to colonial rule. This case selection follows others who have characterized anti-colonial uprisings as insurgencies when they might not be conventionally seen this way.[50] The strike and the series of events that unfolded in its aftermath are constructed using previously classified British official correspondence, propaganda films, parliamentary Hansards, military manuals, annual reports, and news reports.

By examining the police on a local level, more specificity comes to light that is necessary for understanding how policing worked on a daily basis during colonization, given that policing is often generalized to a national level in histories of colonized territories. The police are examined not merely through their organizational principles, policies, or structures, but through their actions and through the discourse circulating among British officials about their role in suppressing colonial uprisings. Similarly, resistance to the police and policing is examined in this case through the actions of ordinary laborers and not only through the lens of a registered union, although the latter is a part of the story.

The location of Tanganyika on the Swahili Coast had long been geopolitically significant as an international trading hub, and it experienced rapid commercial growth in the nineteenth century in coastal towns running south from the modern Kenya/Tanzania border to Dar es Salaam.[51] Dar es Salaam would become the commercial, military, and administrative capital of German East Africa, and roughly thirty years later, the British would designate it their capital of the Tanganyika Territory.[52] When the British took over the Tanganyika Territory after WWI, they continued to develop Dar es Salaam and its large natural harbor, from which the town derived its Arabic name, until it became a major commercial port . WWII would bring an economic boom driven by industrial development, a major increase in the goods that passed through the port, and a dramatic expansion in the formal labor force.[53] Dock work was the most coveted job due to its flexibility and relatively high compensation, although generally wages remained low for unskilled workers and working conditions were horrible. The harbor and other major public works and infrastructure projects provided the 'firm material foundation' of 'local empire' that the British Empire depended on.[54]

A 'challenge to law and order'

In contexts of increasing capitalist industrialization and accumulation, one classic factor that has spurred the growth of the police is the growth of organized labor.[55] This appears to have been the case in Dar es Salaam, where a rise of strikes sparked an increase in surveillance, suppression, and violence at the hands of the police. Special police units had been set up at the harbors and railways, an arrangement dating back to German design of the

city, as these were key points of commerce and transit. Cases of strikes at sites vital to the colonial political economy help illustrate the dynamics between workers and the police leading up to independence and the interlocking growth of uprisings and policing. One notable strike that demonstrates this connection between organized labor and the police was led by the Dockworkers Union in February of 1950 in Dar es Salaam.

In the three years preceding this strike, through collective bargaining and strikes, the Stevedores and Dockworkers Union won pay raises and policies that helped ensure compensation. Sometimes the harbor employers agreed to these demands against the wishes of the Territory's Labor Department, and sometimes negotiations came with compromises for the workers. One such negotiation led to the establishment of 'the scheme for the control and regularization of employment in the industry', which was based on a similar scheme in the United Kingdom.[56] The scheme aimed to 'control' and 'regularize' labor. It proposed to systematize Port Authorities' surveillance by adding a new gate to control workers' entry into the harbor, to register all workers, and to turn daily-paid 'casual' workers into monthly-paid permanent workers. The Union had previously waged and won a battle against a policy that would have forced everyone to become non-casual workers, who tended to receive less in wages than casual workers. The Union opposed this plan again and called for a strike the next day the policy was reintroduced.

In his report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Deputy Governor decried this process as 'irresponsible' and claimed that the Union had called for violence against their own members who attempted to proceed to work, something he deemed 'constituted a challenge to law and order'.[57] The elements of refusal – refusing to be controlled, refusing to be 'regularized', refusing to accept a new surveillance scheme, refusing to be paid less, refusing to work until demands were met, refusing to allow each other to comply with a policy that would economically harm them all, refusing to back down after the Labor Department intervened – are what challenged the Colonial Government's idea of 'law and order'. This refusal was perhaps perceived as such a challenge because it rejected the legitimacy of the imposed law and order and threated the economic extraction that law and order was imposed to maintain. In this sense, resistance was experienced by British officials as a form of insurgency that threatened the very foundation of colonial rule, and so they acted accordingly.

Policing law and order

With law and order at stake on the morning of February 1, the police were called in, which was convenient enough since their barracks were intentionally built across from the harbor and there was a designated special force already in operation on the docks. Some stopped working that morning, but

no formal strike ensued. The Union Executive had called off the strike the night before, although some representatives had allegedly still planned to proceed and advocated for violence. Again at the end of that day, the Union Executive advised workers to return home until negotiations ended.

The next day, February 2, when 800 mostly non-union casual laborers showed up for work, Union officials approached the Senior Superintendent of Police for help with preventing them from working. According to the Deputy Governor's report, the Superintendent 'carefully explained the functions and duties of the Police in connection with labour disputes',[58] which were presumably not to aid and abet challenges to law and order. The Union held another meeting that day calling workers to return to work because the strike voided the terms of their negotiation with their employers. At that point, the Secretary of the Union began sending 'threatening' letters with the Union's demands to the Port Manager, Labour Commissioner, the Chief Secretariat to the Government, and the Private Secretary to the Government. In one of these letters, the Union explained that the police refused to help them because there was no rule 'that some people can be stopped from going on duty'; however, the Union countered that the police regularly 'get a hold of people through the dock area'.[59] The hypocrisy revealed in the police superintendent's claim suggests that the dock was a common site of seizure and arrest. In the Union's eyes, stopping workers from going on duty for the strike did not seem contrary to the police's 'functions and duties'.

On the third day of February, pickets emerged near the docks with enough strength to officially merit police intervention. The police arrested picketers who opposed them or who were reportedly 'found with concealed weapons'.[60] According to the Deputy Governor, 'it was found that in every case the arrested persons were carrying concealed weapons such as knives, axes, iron bars, bottles and clubs' (emphasis in original). From the report, it is ambiguous whether the arrests or the discovery of concealed weapons occurred first. However, the Deputy Governor emphasizes that a group of men incited an attack on the Assistant Superintendent of Police 'with a blow from behind', leading to a 'melee' and a number of injuries, to both policemen and workers.

The police believed that people were leaving to get reinforcements and weapons 'to fight the police, attack their barracks and release arrested persons'.[61] Two hours later, a 'disorderly crowd' of supposedly 2,000 stoned the police's motorized patrol. The police then drove to another station for reinforcements, which were given reluctantly since the Senior Officer at the barracks wanted to protect his own men. Three officers were armed with service revolvers and ammunition and 30 other ranks joined them to break up the 'large hostile mob', which had formed with 'the worst elements armed with clubs, knives, pangas (matchets) and rocks'.

Two constables guarding the vehicles 'misunderstood instructions' and sent them away for reinforcements, leaving 'the small party without adequate transport'. The party got into position and was stoned, leading Assistant Superintendent Stewart to 'warn the crowd that if it did not desist he would have to shoot'. I retain the original description that followed to most accurately reflect the discourse and rationale used to describe the alleged perpetrators and victims of what happened next:

> They continued to attack and the two Assistant Superintendents and the Sub-Inspector fired without effect, and the mob proceeded to further violence. The police were compelled to retreat towards the small vehicle and the crowd attacked. Assistant Superintendent McLoughlin and Sub-Inspector Bannerjee appeared to have covered the rear of the party but were cut off and brutally hacked, receiving ghastly wounds from head to foot. At this point the crowd, apparently satisfied with the damage done, dispersed and the Assistant Superintendent Stewart recovered the wounded officers and brought them back to the barracks.[62]

The reinforcements arrived too late and 'collected one dead rioter', and six rioters were admitted to the hospital with bullet wounds and one of them died there. The three officers were admitted to the hospital (one was treated by a doctor that flew in from abroad for the occasion), while of the 19 constables injured, five were admitted to the hospital.[63] The report also mentions that there was some confusion over how many revolvers and rounds were fired by the officers. The Deputy Governor admits that it was incorrectly stated in a telegram that only one revolver was fired, but he had later learned that all three officers had fired. Two officers were still in critical condition and one revolver was still missing, so at the time of the report, the colonial administrators did not know how any rounds were truly fired.

It appears from this archival file, other police reports, and newspaper clippings that the colonial administration and police always already saw the workers as violent, regardless of whether they were picketing, carrying weapons, or using those weapons. It seems that the Deputy Governor does not mince words in describing the threat that the insurgents posed, as evidenced by his multiple different lists of the weapons the arrested individuals possessed, in 'every case'. Even before describing the 'melee' that ensued on the dock on February 3, in every section of the report, the Deputy Governor claims that the Union was calling for violence. While it is not hard to imagine why workers might turn to whatever means of resistance available in the face of an armed and motorized police unit, a few of the Deputy Governor's claims are ambiguous or contradictory (e.g. the union called off the strike; the union encouraged violence during the strike). This is worth noting not to merely cast doubt on the validity of the Deputy Governor's claims. Rather, this cloudiness helps illuminate what kind of ideas the British had about their colonial subjects and how these ideas informed policing practices and

decisions, sometimes resulting in violence and death. Consider the Police Commissioner's write-up in the Police Annual Report for that year, in which I have italicized language that conveys these views:

> On the 1st February the Dockworkers' and Stevedores' Union called a strike which caused considerable dislocation of the normal port working. By 3rd February, the strikers openly resorted to *intimidation* and *violence* and from an early hour in the morning the Police were busy arresting strike pickets *armed* with *knobkerries, iron bars, knuckle-dusters* and the like. Later in the morning a *riotous mob* moved on the business and shopping centre of the town and were engaged by a Police patrol on the open space known as Mnazi Mmoja. Reference has been made in paragraph nine to the resolution and courage displayed by the Police party on this occasion, who, although heavily outnumbered and *violently attacked*, undoubtedly prevented a serious *spread of rioting*. It was necessary to resort to the use of firearms in self protection and three *rioters* were killed. There were no further acts of *violence* and the life of the town quickly resumed its normal course.[64]

The Police Commissioner describes the dockworkers as being 'armed' with a variety of weapons and openly resorting to 'intimidation and violence', but neglects to mention the number of officers, guns, and rounds that killed and presumably injured many civilians. Similarly, the commissioner described the 'rioters' as violent in the second encounter, yet the police were again the only bearers of firearms and killed three more people. The commissioner applauded the police party's 'resolution and courage' that prevented the 'serious spread of rioting' and enabled the town to 'quickly resume its normal course'. The purpose of the police party was to suppress anything deemed a threat to the economic and social order, and this collective refusal of the dockworkers was deemed a threat; therefore, all accountability for violence rested on their actions, not those of the police.

Aftermath of the insurgency

The Deputy Governor determined that the Union leaders were to blame for the violence and arrested them and searched the headquarters for evidence. At the time of the report downplayed, fifteen people had been sentenced to fifteen months for unlawful assembly.[65] Simultaneously, the report downplays the impact this 'fracas' had on the township and reassures the colonial administrators that everything is under control: 'The normal life of Dar es Salaam was, in fact, little affected by the incidents which passed off almost entirely unnoticed outside the African town. There were rumours that the Railway casual labourers might strike in sympathy with the dock labourers but the rumours proved untrue'. The Provincial Commissioner held a town

meeting, and by his report, the three thousand people who attended 'seemed genuinely anxious to dissociate themselves from the conduct of the hooligan element'.

The Deputy Governor sought to impress upon his higher-ups in London that the threat was eliminated. The instigators were believed to 'have left town' and 'at no time was the situation out of hand but the unfortunate incident involving serious injuries to two police officers naturally raised some public alarm'.[66] Newspapers reported that the police opened fire on the rioters and denounced them as 'hooligans' and a 'small irresponsible element', language that was perhaps intended to underplay one thousand dock strikers attacking the police.[67] Also reportedly, 'murders', 'disorder', and 'riots' followed in the several days' aftermath of the strike.[68]

But more than anything, the Deputy Governor sought to reassure the Colonial Secretary of State that business was able to continue as usual: 'It is an important feature that throughout the period of the strike the port was kept working; between 700 and 800 men were employed on the 2nd and 3rd of February and by the 5th February the numbers had increased to over 1,000, and the number of persons applying for work exceeded the number required by several hundreds'.[69] The Deputy Governor seemed to cast this as a successful story of police intervention and control that prevented a near insurgency. Despite some injuries and deaths, the threat was neutralized and business could resume, the main imperatives of the police and colonial government. This is an important case for understanding the role of the police and military, decisions to use force, and strategies to suppress collective uprisings.

This is also an important case for understanding acts of resistance against the colonial police and colonialism at large and how this impacted the material power and training of the police at the turn of independence. After this incident, various British ministers expressed concern about the availability of police weapons and equipment.[70] One circular dispatch from June 1948 informed all colonies 'of the desirability of using tear smoke', and in November 1949, a London police officer encouraged the Commissioner of Police to obtain the requisite supplies for using this kind of riot-control weapon. Another colonial official in London was 'disturbed' that Tanganyika still did not have tear gas bombs, but no 'formal enquiry into the disturbance' was necessary. The next month, one thousand grenades (No. 91) were requested, but upon being unavailable, the Crown Agents informed the Tanganyika police of 'the various American weapons on the market' and advised that they 'enquire which types should be ordered'.[71] The market for weapons and tactical advice was another aspect of counterinsurgency policing that was apparently transnational.

In addition to further militarizing the police, the Tanganyika Department of Labor and London Colonial Office changed their strategy. They gave up on collective bargaining 'experiments' and created a Wage Board (following the

example in Nairobi) that would fix the wages in the port industry, issue registration and photo ID cards, and introduce attendance tickets as part of a 'labour control scheme', similar to that of the National Dock Labour Board in the United Kingdom.[72]

Conclusion

Throughout the year 1950, there would be 50 strikes involving at least 7,444 workers and resulting in 11,006 working days lost, according to the Tanganyika *Annual Report of the Labour Department*.[73] Further, this year of strikes is just one in a long history of organized labor in Tanganyika throughout British colonial rule. Workers also staged a wave of strikes around the African continent following WWII, and labor organizers were in many cases connected to nationalist movements that toppled formal colonial rule.[74] Docks, railways, and mines became key sites for resisting suppression, but also for suppressing resistance. Examining policing as counterinsurgency in these commercial centers adds a crucial dimension to the transnational nature of policing and resistance to imperial rule.

This case provides a unique and essential vantage point for tapping into the dynamics between the police, colonized populations and workers, and the British Empire. By centering the police in the colonial response to resistance, this study deepens knowledge about the police as a fundamental, shared, and interconnected aspect of counterinsurgency responses. Furthermore, it brings to light a long lineage of collective organizing in resistance to policing, surveillance, and exploitation. Future comparative work could use this approach for broader theorizing,[75] more generalizable structural analyses,[76] and complementary case studies of policing around the world and resistance to it.

Notes

1. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*; Hack, "The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm."
2. Bennett, *Fighting the Mau Mau*; Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*; Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*.
3. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*; Cesarani, "The War on Terror That Failed."
4. Bennett, "From Direct Rule to Motorman"; Newsinger, "From Counter-insurgency to Internal Security"; Tuck, "Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency."
5. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*; Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*; Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*; Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*; Kitson, *Bunch of Five*.
6. Alderson, "Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine," 8; "British Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Part 10 – Countering Insurgency."

7. Dixon, ""Hearts and Minds"?"; French, "Nasty Not Nice"; Hack, "Everyone Lived in Fear." As Dixon points out, the shortcomings of the British Army's "hearts and minds" strategy came to a head in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, leading to a reassessment of the U.K.'s reputation as a world leader of this counterinsurgency approach.
8. Dixon, *The British Way of Counterinsurgency*. Also see the special issue, "British Ways of Counter-Insurgency: A Historical Perspective" in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Volume 23, Issue 4–5 (2012).
9. Petraeus and Amos, "Army Field Manual 3–24," For example, see section 3–18, "Asymmetric Tactics in Ireland" and section 6–21, "Developing a Police Force in Malaya"; Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics."
10. French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency,1945–1967*.
11. "British Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Part 10 – Countering Insurgency," sec. CS 1–1.
12. Ibid., CS 1-3-15.
13. Ibid., CS 1–1. The manual further explains that the British campaign failed in Ireland because "the lessons of effective policing in India had not been transposed to Ireland until it was too late" (CS 1-1-5).
14. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*.
15. "British Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Part 10 – Countering Insurgency," sec. CS 1-2-7.
16. For example, see testimonies in Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*; Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*.
17. Alderson, "Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine," 9.
18. Cohen et al., "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," 51.
19. Petraeus and Amos, "Army Field Manual 3–24," section 6–19 through 6–22.
20. See note 18 above. 51.
21. See note 19 above.section 6-19 through 6-20.
22. See note 18 above. 51.
23. Seigel, *Violence Work*, 13–14 and chapter 2.
24. "The Police Ordinance, 1933," 7. These clauses introduced in the Tanganyika Police Ordinance of 1933 were modeled on the Kenya Police Ordinance of 1930.
25. Ibid.
26. Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, 68–70. Sinclair points out a 'dichotomy' among British colonial officials following World War II, when there was an increase of challenges to colonial rule across the Empire: "the Colonial Police Service was expected to modernize on British lines and embrace the concept of civil policing; on the other hand its officers would still be expected to operate in a military capacity as a colony's first line of defense" (69).
27. Sinclair, 69–70.
28. See note 15 above.section CS 1-2-10.
29. French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency,1945–1967*, 17.
30. Brogden, "The Emergence of the Police – The Colonial Dimension," 11–13.
31. Ibid., 12.
32. Incidents like the 1819 Peterloo Massacre led to increased government crackdowns and surveillance. The British calvary charged a crowd of about 80,000 unarmed civilians who were demanding parliamentary representation reforms, killing 18 people and injuring as many as 700.
33. Anderson and Killingray, *Policing the Empire*. Often left out of the professionalized police origin story is the deputization of slave patrols in the American Virginia and Carolina colonies in the early 1700s, predating the establishment of the Royal Irish Constabulary formed in 1836. See Hadden, *Slave Patrols*.

34. Karstedt, "Durkheim, Tarde and Beyond: The Global Travel of Crime Policies," 18.
35. For an excellent illustration of this, see the 'doctrine flow chart' from the Office of Public Safety introduced in 1963 in Schrader, *Badges without Borders*, 17.
36. Seigel, *Violence Work*; Schrader, *Badges without Borders*.
37. "The Police Ordinance, 1933 (No. 23 of 1933). Legal Report from the Acting Attorney General."
38. Ibid. The Acting Attorney General describes the rationale behind this new provision: "Clause 35 grants protection to police officers in respect of suits instituted against them in consequence of acts done in obedience to a warrant." The clause includes a long elaboration of this protection and states that no proof of a signature of the magistrate or justice is required, and if the signature is not genuine but the officer thought it was, "judgment shall nevertheless be given in favour of such police officer" ("The Police Ordinance, 1933," 18).
39. "The Police Ordinance, 1933 (No. 23 of 1933). Legal Report from the Acting Attorney General."; "The Police Ordinance, 1933," 29–31.
40. "The Prison Ordinance, 1933 (No. 24 of 1933). Legal Report from the Acting Attorney General."
41. Ibid.
42. Mike Brogden has pointed out the circulation of police officers and practices between colonies and the metropole as well. See Brogden, "The Emergence of the Police – The Colonial Dimension," 11.
43. "The Police Ordinance, 1933," 11. There were also common conditions of service for civil servants in Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika, and their terms were debated by colonial officials throughout the Empire, covering benefits, wages, clerical or non-clerical status for police and prison staff, etc. "African Civil Service: Conditions of Service."
44. For example, see Callander, *One Beat of a Butterfly's Heart*, 31.
45. Similarly, we might also expect people who lived under colonial rule, especially workers traveling between colonized territories, to talk and share experiences with being policed. Thank you to Stuart Schrader for pointing this out and recommending Claude McKay's novels as an entry point to imagining what these transnational connections might have looked like (e.g. see McKay, *Banjo)*.
46. "Use of the Tanganyika Police Force in Nyasaland."
47. Tanganyika Police, "Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report on the Administration of the Police 1959."
48. Macoun would leave Uganda in 1965 (Uganda gained independence in 1962), go on a lecture tour of the United States, teach at the National Police Staff College in the United Kingdom, and then serve as Inspector-General of Police in the Colonial Office, followed by a departmental merger and title change to "Overseas Police Adviser/Inspector General of Police of the Dependent Territories," during which he traveled to 78 countries. Throughout his tenure as Overseas Police Adviser, Macoun would advise on Police Training to the Overseas Development Administration, serve as the U.K. delegate at twelve Interpol Conferences, and visit sites of 'incipient disorder.' Macoun, *Wrong Place, Right Time*.
49. The rapid and unprecedented growth of the police apparatus following WWII is evident from analyzing police budgets, personnel and recruitment totals, and arrest rates in "Annual Reports of the Administration of the Police" throughout formal British colonial rule in Tanganyika. Reports were located by the author in the British Library and cover roughly forty years, between 1920 to 1960.

50. E.g. The Gold Coast and British Guiana are treated as insurgencies in French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency,1945–1967*.
51. Brennan and Burton, "The Emerging Metropolis. A History of Dar Es Salaam, circa 1862–2000," 14–15.
52. Today the Dar es Salaam Port is responsible for 90% of Tanzania's trade (World Bank, 'Opening the Gates.') and serves as the gateway to six landlocked countries (Malawi, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo). It is one of the most important urban centers in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the largest cities in Africa. (Brennan and Burton, "The Emerging Metropolis. A History of Dar Es Salaam, circa 1862–2000.")
53. Brennan and Burton, "The Emerging Metropolis. A History of Dar Es Salaam, circa 1862–2000," 46–47. In the post-war decade, the Dar es Salaam Port saw a threefold increase to almost one million in the tonnage of goods passing through in 1956, and the formal labor force in the city expanded from 14,000 in 1931, to 36,000 by 1952, mostly in domestic servants. Brennan and Burton, 47.
54. Edward and Hård, "Maintaining the Local Empire," 43.
55. Spitzer and Scull, "Privatization and Capitalist Development"; Harring, *Policing A Class Society*.
56. Fletcher-Cooke, "Confidential Telegram from Fletcher-Cooke to Jones, with Memorandum on "Industrial Dispute: Dar Es Salaam Docks February, 1950.""
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. The Stevedores and Dockworkers Union, "Letter from The Stevedores and Dockworkers Union to The Chief Secretariat to the Government."
60. See note 56 above.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Tanganyika Police, "Tanganyika Territory: Annual Report on the Administration of the Police 1950," 8.
65. See note 56 above.
66. Ibid.
67. "Tanganyika: Strikes and Riots."
68. Reuter, "Attempted Murder."
69. See note 56 above.
70. See note 67 above.
71. "Confidential Minute on Police Response to Dock Workers Union Strike."
72. Molohan, "Letter from Molohan to Parry."
73. Jackson, "The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania," 220.
74. Cooper, ""Our Strike""; Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*.
75. Brodeur, *The Policing Web*.
76. Garland, *The Culture of Control*.

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